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Shifting Paradigms of Parochialism: Lessons for International
Trade Law*
ELIZABETH TRUJILLO**
John Sexton characterized the endeavour of teaching globally as an academic calling
for the 'global common enterprise. ' He explains that the rule of law plays an integral
role in integrating a 'global village' and bridging different legal and cultural traditions.2
It is in this exchange that involved parties may begin to question their own laws,
redefine legal applications through comparative inquiry and adapt their legal systems
for the sake of a larger common enterprise.
Much of the study of international private law has focused on exploring
differences in legal systems in light of domestic issues or harmonization.3 Much less
* This is an extended version of a paper presented at the American Society of International Law-
International Economic Law Group 20o6 Annual Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.
The proceedings of this conference will be published in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw: THE STATE
AND FuTURE OF THE DIscIPLINE, Hart Publishing, Oxford University Press, eds. Picker, Bunn and
Arner (forthcoming February 2oo8).
"Associate Professor at Suffolk University Law School. E-mail: etrujillo@suffolk.edu. The author
would like to thank Professor Gabriel Cavazos, director of the LL.M. Program in International
Trade Law (Maestrla en Derecho Comercial Internacional) at the Monterrey Institute of
Technology (Instituto Tecnol6gico de Monterrey) (ITESM) Monterrey, Mexico for his
collaboration on the joint NAFTA course discussed in this paper. The author would also like to
thank the members of the law school at ITESM and the University of Detroit Mercy School of Law
(UDM) for their support. Special thanks to the students from ITESM and UDM participating
together in this project via satellite. Their willingness to learn from and about each other made
this experience possible. The author initiated this project during her time as assistant professor at
UDM as a part of preliminary negotiations between UDM and ITESM for future collaborative
work. UDM offers a J.D.-LLB. program with the University of Windsor Faculty of Law. The idea
for this project arose out of the hope that someday U.S., Canadian and Mexican law students could
learn from and about each other by working together on issues concerning NAFTA and North
America. This was a first step in making that dream a reality.
I John Sexton, The Academic Calling: To Global Common Enterprise, 51 J. Legal Educ. 403
(2001).
2 Ibid. at 403 (stating that '[t]he rule of law will permeate an emerging global village, touching
societies it never has touched . And the success of this new community will depend in large part
upon the integration and accommodation of disparate traditions through law.').
3 See generally, Mark A. Drmbl, Amalgam in the Americas: A Law School Curriculum for Free
Markets and Open Borders, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1O53 (1998) (exploring ways in which to create
a NAFTA curriculum that will foster harmonization within the context of NAFrA); Steven Zamora,
NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12
ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 401 (1995) (stating that NAFrA will encourage harmonization among
the three countries at various levels and that university programs can be key to fostering
harmonization). But see, Adelle Blackett, Globalization and Its Ambiguities: Implications for
Law School Curricular Reform, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57, 58 (1998) (proposing a different
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attention has focused on accepting these differences as part of the global legal
structure and on examining the traditions engendering these differences as a source of
understanding parochial interests.4 Exploring the cultural and legal differences among
trading partners brings light to a world of 'hybrid legal spaces,' adding complexity to
the adjudication of commercial, foreign investment and even trade disputes.5
This paper asserts that globalized legal education can explore differences in
laws not only as a means for harmonization or convergence or for finding solutions in
domestic law, but also as a means of fostering understanding of domestic parochial
interests within a society. Particularly in the context of regionalism, it is in building
alliances that extend beyond the parochial network that a new common tradition may
form.6 In exchanging parochial attitudes, students may begin to appreciate that
compliance with international principles is driven in part by the recognition that
through voluntary cooperation, domestic interests may also be best served.
While thinking 'globally' appears too vast and amorphous of a concept to
translate into practical terms, thinking 'regionally' offers an opportunity for a real
exchange by tapping into common regional interests and, in turn, a true exchange in
culture, values and social norms.7 In the context of the North American Free Trade
Area (NAFTA) for example, the United States, Canada and Mexico have not only
increased trade8 but also have attempted to find ways of coordinating regulations in
order to enhance economic exchange. Furthermore, this coordination has emerged not
only in the form of harmonization but also as convergence. For example, NAFrA
starting point for the globalization in legal education-one that focuses on the 'ambiguities of
globalization.'); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. INT'L L. 1103, Mii6 (2000)
(characterizing the influence of judicial applications of various domestic constitutions as an
important part of the 'cross-fertilization' within a domestic legal system).
4 See Patrick Glenn, Symposium on Continuing Progress in Internationalizing Legal Education-
21st Century Global Challenges: Integrating Civil and Common Law Teaching Throughout the
Curriculum: The Canadian Experience, 21 PENN. ST. INT'L L REv. 69, 74 (2002) 74 (recognizing
that while teaching of multiple laws is challenging, 'the object of transnational legal education is
not legal unification or even facilitating convergence, but rather understanding of difference and
the underlying reasons for difference').
5 See generally, Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAw
REvqew, (forthcoming 20o7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=985340 (applying a pluralist framework to international law and arguing that this framework
can help 'manage a world of hybrid legal spaces').
6 See H. Patrick Glenn, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD at 49 (discussing that globalization
allows for an extension of traditions that are beyond the state).
7 See Patrick Glenn, Conflicting Laws in a Common Market? The NAFTA Experiment, 76 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 1789 (2001) (explaining that regionalization is an important factor in the elimination
of physical, political and legal borders because 'we define the new regions not so much in terms of
geophysical boundaries...but in terms of new political and legal boundaries that surpass those of
the state.').
8 For example, total U.S. merchandise trade by truck between the U.S. and Canada increased by
113% from 1993 to 2002 and between the U.S. and Mexico, by 319%. See Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, located at http://www.bts.gov/cgi-bin/breadrumbs/PrintVersion.cgi?date=27150819.
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parties have attempted to find commonalities among their policies rather than purely
establish identical regulations or laws.9 For example, since 2OOl, regional integration
has extended into the energy sector through increased cooperation in setting efficiency
and labelling standards under the North American Energy Working Group
(NAEWG). 1o Increased investment through cooperative alliances and joint ventures
has also contributed to stronger ties among the NAFTA partners.,,
Parochialism generally has a negative connotation for supporters of free
trade. Nonetheless, at some level, free trade may itself strengthen internal pressures to
establish parochialism through powerful domestic networks. Such networks may form
because of a perceived need among network members that if united, they may fight
against 'outsiders' who want to dominate them.12 However counterintuitive it seems,
parochial interests are a part of the global structure. Therefore, in teaching
international trade law, one should strive to help students understand the relevant
parochial interests and the political and economic forces that drive them.
I. Domestic Parochialism
The effect that parochialism has on compliance with international trade agreements
lends itself to inquiry into what drives parochial attitudes. The social sciences teach us
that parochialism generally arises from the tendency for people to favor groups in
which they are members, at the expense of outsiders and even their individual
interests. Professors Schwartz-Shea and Simmons describe this tendency as one
flowing from a perceived 'self-interest' that in aiding the group that includes
themselves, they will promote their individual interests.13 Jonathan Baron identifies
this 'self-interest' as a 'self-interest illusion', which explains why individuals are more
willing to sacrifice individual interests for those of certain groups but not for larger-
encompassing groups.14 He explains that a sense of altruism drives parochial
attitudes-that individuals may find affinity with groups to which they identify
9 See Ronald D. Knutson and Rene F. Ochoa, Convergence, Harmonization and Compatibility
under NAFTA: A 2003 Status Report, available at http://www.farmfoundation.org/
farmpolicy/knutson-ochoa.pdf. (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (distinguishing convergence from
harmonization by explaining that convergence requires 'commonality of policy' rather than the
implementation of uniform programs or regulations through harmonization).
10 Stephen Wel and Laura Van Wie McGrory, Regional Cooperation in Energy Efficiency
Standard-Setting and Labeling in North America, available at http://www.osti.gov/
bridge/servlets/purl/ 824274-oMHxDS/native/824274.pdf. (last visited Feb. 2, 2007).
11 See David Sparling and Roberta Cook, Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures under NAFTA:
Concepts and Evidence (stating that strategic alliances and joint ventures are the 'new
international business norm'), available at, http://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/aredepart/
facultydocs/Cook/ rankfoodii/june25final.pdf. (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
See generally infra section I.
13 See Schwartz-Shea, P. & Simmons, RT., Egoism, Parochialism and Universalism, RATIONAITY
AND SOCIETY, Vol. 3, No. 1, 106-132 (Jan. 1991).
'4 See Jonathan Baron, Parochialism as a Result of Cognitive Biases, Oct. 1, 2005 at 3, available
at http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/Workshop%2oBPE/Baron.pdf. (last visited Feb. 1, 2oo7).
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ethnically, culturally, religiously or even politically. As a result, powerful networks may
arise domestically. Professors Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis define two levels of
parochialism in network formations:
1. more obvious network formation based on perceived common traditions in
ethnicity, cultural values, politics and religion; and
2. one based on underlying economic advantages within the 'problem solving
capacities of networks.'15
Members may identify with such powerful networks because of these
common traditions or advantages. In this context, parochial attitudes may result from
a lack of memory that in fact origins have been pluralist in nature.16
The power of these networks remains puzzling in a world of increased
globalization. These powerful networks resist integration with other networks,
especially those outside their geographical borders. One reason for this phenomenon
may be that such networks, though insular, may 'solve economic problems that are
resistant to market or state-based solutions.'17 Despite the more obvious cultural,
religious, or political affinities that members of such networks seem to share, there is a
recognizable economic advantage to remaining insular and loyal to the network
However we choose to characterize parochialism, it permeates movements at the
domestic level which resist globalization at the multilateral and even regional levels.
For the purposes of this paper, this attitude is characterized as domestic parochialism.
In discussing parochialism in this context, the focus is on individual attitudes and the
way they translate into the larger national scale. There are obvious limitations to
applying observations made originally on individuals to a nation consisting of a
multitude of special interest groups. However, a full discussion of these limitations is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Free trade agreements challenge the power of such networks. In particular,
the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers forces nations to become less protectionist
and to suspend their parochial attitudes. While eliminating economic protectionism
may be at the core of free trade, trade agreements do not guarantee it even if the
national will to become a member of a larger, global community is present. The
concept of national treatment, for example, as required under Article III of GATT or in
Is Bowles and Gintis, Persistent Parochialism, at 2 (stating that '[m]embers, of course, do not
normally express their identification with networks in terms of their economic advantages.
Rather, they typically invoke religious faith, ethnic-purity, or personal loyalty. These sentiments
often support exclusion or shunning of outsiders.'). The authors explain that among 'the problem-
solving capacities of networks are the powerful contractual enforcement mechanisms made
possible by small-scale interactions, notably effective punishing of those who fail to keep
promises, facilitated by close social ties, frequent and variegated interactions and the availability
of low cost information concerning one's trading partners.' Ibid.
16 H. Patrick Glenn, Transnational Legal Theory and Practice Essay, 29 FORDHAM INV'L L. J. 457
(20o6).
17 Bowles and Gintis, supra note 15 at 3.
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various chapters of the NAFMA is a principle directed at combating protectionism at its
core.8 However, distinguishing between national treatment violations and domestic
regulatory measures can be problematic for international trade adjudicatory bodies.
Regulatory measures, even if found to be legitimate because of a public purpose, may
be protectionist in nature and in turn serve parochial interests.
II. Regionalism, Hybridization and Larger Problem-Solving Networks
Economic integration through regionalism may help propel the emergence of new and
hybrid cultures.19 Hybridization, as characterized by Jadish Bhagwati, generates
cultural, social and economic alliances which can help form larger regional networks.20
Furthermore, hybridization can create hybrid legal cultures. This can occur, for
example, through assimilation of different legal norms and procedural mechanisms.
Also, jurisdictional overlaps may emerge when different legal regimes have jurisdiction
over a common issue. For example, NAFrA allows disputes arising both under NAFTA
and the WTO to be brought under either jurisdiction at the discretion of the involved
parties.21 In the context of the NAFrA partners, a NAFTA parochialism may be the
source of power within a multilateral framework.-
a. NAFTA Parochialism
Assuming the existence of different well-established domestic networks, the question
remains of how to coordinate and reconcile the various interests they espouse. The
challenge this presents can lead to more division and differentiation among the
networks. For some international lawyers, harmonization may be one solution.
However, harmonization attempts to supplant local norms with universal ones and, in
turn, has a hegemonic effect which can just fuel local networks in their resistance to
i8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 amended
by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-The Uruguay Round: Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 IL.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter GATr], art, III. See
generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, app. 1, 33 IL.M. 1125 (1994). See also North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 296-456, 605-
800 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA], arts. 1102, 1202, 1405, 1703.
19 Jagdish Bhagwati, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION at 107 (describing various anti-globalization
forces which the author terms as 'global pessimists' and opining that 'economic globalization is a
culturally enriching process.').
20 Ibid. at log (illustrating examples of cultural 'hybridization' resulting from globalization).
21 See e.g. NAFTA, supra note 21, art. 2005. See also Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note
5, at 41 (discussing jurisdictional overlaps).
22 See Patrick Glenn, Conflicting Laws, supra note 7, at 1791 (2001) (distinguishing the NAFTA
experience form the European Union and characterizing the member states of NAFTA as 'internal
common markets').
46 Journal of International Law and International Relations
integrate regionally or globally.23 For the NAFTA partners, harmonization may not
necessarily resolve their cultural, political, economic and legal differences. Perhaps
resolving these differences is not the goal at all. Another approach could be one in
which parties may draw on their commonalities to create institutions that work toward
addressing shared interests. In this way, such institutions would implement
procedural and normative mechanisms that would embrace the pluralist nature of
their shared common space.24
Despite their differences, NAFTA partners do share some historical and
political characteristics. They are all federalist in nature even if the distribution of
power and authority may vary from country to country.25 Each recognizes the political
independence of their internal states while recognizing that the power of the states is
limited for the common good of the nation, especially in terms of commerce. For
example, in the United States, the dormant commerce clause limits the power of the
states in interstate commerce.26 However, the states retain their power in other areas.
Mexico, on the other hand, places much political authority in the national legislature
and its national administrative agencies.27 Canada has perhaps the most decentralized
system of the three NAFrA member states.28 Commerce power of the Canadian federal
government, for example, is much narrower than in the United States. Canada, as a
nation, has attempted to become more centralized as well.29
All three also share some historical experiences. They were once colonies of
European colonialism that, despite periods of royal or dictatorial dominance,
eventually developed into republics and not kingdoms. They even have occupied and
fought over the same territory at different points in history. For example, the 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ceded to the U.S. certain Mexican territories that today
include the states of Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, California, Nevada, Utah and
Wyoming. While each nation has developed distinctively, they share some common
traditions that, if fostered, can help form the basis of a quilt of hybridization. In
enhancing these common threads, such hybridization can lead to the development of a
23 See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 5, at 28 (describing harmonization as failing to
meet the realities of diversity among societies and as potentially being hegemonic).
24 Ibid.
25 See Mark A. Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas, supra note 3, at 1062-1072 (1998) (describing
generally the differences in political structures and legal systems between the three member states
of NAFTA).
26 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824); Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
27 U.S. 245 (1829); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851); DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273
U.S. 34 (1927); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
27 See Drumbl, Amalam in the Americas, supra note 3, at lO62-1072. For more on the Mexican
legal and political system, see generally Steve Zamora (with Cossio, Pereznieto, Roldbn and
L6pez), MexcAN LAw, Oxford University Press, 2004.
28 See Drumbl, Amalam in the Americas, supra note 3, at 1072.
29 See generally, Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalism of Canada and the United States. 55
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMs 107 (comparing federalism in the United States and Canada).
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new common tradition that surpasses parochial interests, without necessarily
replacing them and in which parochial networks may form alliances. That is, domestic
parochialism may be replaced by a NAFTA parochialism.
Defining the parameters of regionalism vis a vis the multilateral trade
regime is not easy. Trade distortions could emerge as a result of too much emphasis on
regional interests or political alliances and these could certainly lead to detrimental
effects for the global community more generally. After all, one of the reasons for
implementing the GATT was to avoid another World War primarily caused by
powerful political military alliances.30 Regional strength should only exist within a
strong multilateral system. In the context of trade, this relationship is continually
being tested through WTO decisions that implicate regional partners without clear
recognition of the regional issues at play. 31 For example, there are jurisdictional
overlaps in the adjudication of disputes concerning antidumping and countervailing
duty measures as well as alleged national treatment violations.32 In Mexico-Tax
Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages, for example, the WTO panel and later
the appellate body decided that Mexico's tax on soda bottlers using high fructose corn
syrup rather than sugar was protectionist.33 This same issue has been considered in a
Chapter ii foreign investment NAFTA claim by the US investor affected by the tax.34
Though the issue has not yet been resolved by the NAFrA arbitration tribunal, NAFTA
Chapter 11 tribunals have in the past deferred to WTO decisions regarding national
treatment violations under Article III of GATr.35
More recently, however, the Chapter 11 NAFTA tribunal in Methanex
Corporation v. Government of the United States dealt with a California regulation
that, because of alleged health and environmental risks, banned the use of methanol in
30 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAw
AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 21 (2000) (stating that the goals behind the GATT agreement included
'the prevention of war and the establishment of a just system of economic relations' as well as 'the
economic benefits that might derive from international trade and economic stability') . See also
Colin Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. The WTO: A Proposal For Reform Of Article XXIV
To Counter This Institutional Threat, 26 U. Pa. J. Int'l. Econ. L. 267, 280 (2005) (discussing
interwar concerns regarding regionalism).
31 See Elizabeth Trujillo, Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic Regulatory
Structures and the WTO, 40 CORNELL INTrL L. J. 201 (2oo7), also available at
http://papers.ssrrcom/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=933447.
32 For a discussion of jurisdictional overlaps among domestic, NAFTA and WTO regimes, see
Elizabeth Trujillo, Defining Jurisdictional Overlaps in the Midst of Regionalism (draft available
with author).
33 See Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and other Beverages, Wr/DS3o8/4, June 11, 2004
and WT/DS3o8/R, October 7, 2005 [hereinafter Mexico-Tax Measures] . See also Trujillo,
Mission Possible, supra note 31.
34 See Corn Products International v. Government of the United Mexican States, Request for
Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, Oct. 28, 2003 [hereinafter Corn Products].
35 See Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 31, part III for a discussion of NAFTA Chapter 11
decisions discussing WTO adjudication of national treatment violations.
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reformulated gasoline. Here, the Chapter ii tribunal clearly stated that NAFTA
tribunals are not required to look to WTO panel decisions as precedent for their own
decisions.36 Determining which regulatory measures are legitimate (and therefore not
in violation of commitments under GATT) is a challenge for international trade
adjudicatory bodies. Regulatory measures aimed at placating domestic parochial
attitudes can masquerade as legitimate and nonprotectionist. Therefore, creating
larger capacity networks that incorporate the economic advantages to globalization is
important at the domestic level.
b. Reconciling Pluralist Interests
Professor Patrick Glenn distinguishes between legal systems exclusive to the nation
state and legal traditions that are more encompassing and 'transcend state law.'37 He
explains that '[s]tates of immediately cognate traditions may bind together in some
supranational form, in an effort to catch up to their own, constitutive traditions.'38
Hybridization through regionalism offers an opportunity for new common traditions
to emerge, pluralist in nature, but unified in a common economic interest.39
Professor Paul Schiff Berman envisions a world of hybrid legal spaces in
which pluralism serves as a means of managing, rather than eliminating or
supplanting, hybridity.4o He explains that 'normative conflict among multiple,
overlapping legal systems is unavoidable' and can lead to alternative forms of conflict
resolution and change.41 Embracing hybridization as an essential part of international
law challenges traditional views of state sovereignty and diminishes the power of
internal networks. From this perspective, the goal of international law is no longer
defining its parameters as a separate legal space, but rather finding procedural and, in
some instances, normative mechanisms of managing and coordinating various legal
norms and institutions. For example, NAFTA itself contains trade requirements such
36 See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits,
Aug. 9, 2005, Part III, ch. B, $ 37, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
51052.pdf. [hereinafter Methanex] . See also Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 31, at parts III
& IV (discussing the tendency of NAFTA tribunals to defer to WTO decisions and the interesting
complexities that these jurisdictional overlaps present. This article also reflects on the impact of
Methanex in future NAFTA tribunals and their decisions vis d vis similar WTO decisions).
37 Patrick Glenn, Symposium on Continuing Progress in Internationalizing Legal Education,
supra note 4, at 69 (stating that '[t]he notion of a legal tradition is one which transcends state law,
but there is no accepted or likely-to-be accepted language of the "multi-traditional" or "pan-
traditional".') .See generally, H. Patrick Glenn, LEGAL TRADrnONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 6, at
ch's 1 and 2.
38 See H. Patrick Glenn, LEGAL TRADIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 6, at 49.
39 See Patrick Glenn, Conflicting Laws, supra note 7, at 1789 (2001) (explaining that
regionalization is an important factor in the elimination of physical, political and legal borders
because 'we define the new regions not so much in terms of geophysical boundaries...but in terms
of new political and legal boundaries that surpass those of the state.).
40 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 5, at 8.
41 See ibid.
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as national treatment which could be adjudicated in different legal regimes such as in
the case of Corn Products International v. United Mexican States and the WTO case
Mexico-Tax Measures. The various legal regimes under NAFTA may overlap with
domestic regimes as well, such as in Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond Loewen v.
United States, where a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal addressed a Mississippi court
decision regarding a Canadian investor in that state.42 At times legal regimes
adjudicating the same cases may arrive at different decisions. A domestic court or
agency may rule in a different manner than a NAFTA tribunal as may a WTO panel, as
in the Softwood Lumber cases.43 Such jurisdictional overlap is becoming
commonplace. Pluralism embraces such jurisdictional hybridization and allows for a
'dialectical approach' to resolving international disputes.44
Professor Ruti Teitel, in examining approaches to comparative constitutional
law, expresses concern that the traditional functionalist approach to comparative
inquiry fails to resolve modem practical problems arising from hybridization.45
Rather, a dialogical inquiry is preferable in this context because of its potential for
generating 'cosmopolitan effects that mat well transcend any individual state.'4
6
42 Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond Loewen v. United States, Award on Merits (NAFTA Ch. ii
Arb. Trib., June 26, 2003) (dismissing the claims on its merits because claimants failed to show
no remedy under U.S. municipal law).
43 See generally, In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-o3 (NAFTA Ch. 19 Binational [U.S.-
Can.] Panel Aug. 13, 2003, June 7, 2004, Dec. 1, 2004, May 23, 2005, Oct. 5, 2005, & Mar. 17,
2oo6), In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Final Affirmative Antidumping
Determination, USA-CDA-2002-19o4-o2 (NAFTA Ch. 19 Binational [U.S.-Can.] Panel July 17,
2003, Mar. 5, 2004, & June 9, 2005), In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
Final Affirmative Threat of Injury Determination, USA-CDA-2002-19o4-o7 (NAFTA Ch. 19
Binational [U.S.-Can.] Panel Sept. 5, 2003, Apr. 19, 2004, & Aug. 31, 2004) and In re Certain
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Order, ECC-2004-1904-ol USA (NAFrA Ch. 19
Extraordinary Challenge Comm. Aug. 10, 2005). See also, Appellate Body Report, United States-
Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5, WT/DS257/AB/RW, para. 96 (Dec. 5, 2005). For a discussion
of the Softwood lumber case and the potential conflicts between the NAFTA and the WTO
regimes, see generally International Decision: Softwood Lumber Dispute (2o0-2oo6), 1oo AM.
J. INT'L LAW 664 (2006).
44 See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 5, at 32-33 (stating that 'a pluralist approach
understands that interactions between various tribunals and regulatory authorities are more likely
to take on a dialectical quality that is neither direct hierarchical review traditionally undertaken by
appellate judges, nor simply the dialogue that often occurs under the doctrine of comity.).
45 Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, Book Review of COMPARATIVE
CONMST ONALISM: Cases and Materials, eds. Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld Andrfs Saj6 &
Suzanne Baer (2003), 117 HARv. L. REV. 2570, 2584-2586. In reviewing a book on Comparative
Constitutionalism by Michel Rosenfeld Andris Saj6 & Suzanne Baer, the author compares the
functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches in comparative constitutionalism to a more
modern, the 'dialogical approach.' The author explains that the dialogical approach allows for
theories on comparative constitutionalism 'as a dynamic interpretative and discursive practice.'
Ibid.
46 Ibid. at 2586-2587.
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In a similar way, there is no consensus on whether the WTO has
institutionalized universal normative standards for dealing with issues of international
trade. It is even less clear if in fact the WTO panels are establishing universal norms of
trade law for the international economic community.47 Perhaps at one level, the GATT
sets the floor for norms accepted in international trade, both multilaterally and
regionally. Principles of national treatment, most-favoured nation treatment and
market access are examples of such normative standards. The adjudicatory bodies of
the WTO and the NAFrA, for example, grapple with these principles and make their
decisions based on standards of international law and the Covered Agreements of the
WTO.48 However, many of the problems dealing with these principles arise within the
domestic context of government measures such as regulation or even deregulation.
Within these contexts, the role of the WTO as a regulatory model setting trade norms
is questioned.49 In this role, the WTO may disassociate problems from their domestic
or regional context much in the same way that a neofunctionalist approach to
comparative constitutionalism 'abstracts problems from their particular contexts to
arrive at a constitutionalism hardly identifiable with politics or place.'so Because of the
need for domestic regimes to enforce the decisions of adjudicatory bodies in free trade
agreements, WTO panels and regional tribunals cannot entirely disassociate
international issues from their domestic or regional contexts if their decisions are to
have real clout. A dialogical approach may help to resolve disputes arising in different
jurisdictional regimes and encourage dispute resolution bodies to inform each other
on related issues.51
III. The Classroom Exchange Promotes Hybridization
What does hybridization through regionalism say about cross-border legal education
and, more specifically, for the future of NAFTA lawyers? It is the axis around which
any course in NAFTA may encourage a dialogue among participants whose countries
47 See Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 5, at 26 (discussing universalism); See also
Trujillo, Mission Possible, supra note 31.
48 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, app. 1, 33 IL.M. 1125 (1994).
49 See generally, John 0. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary: The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARV. L REv. 511 (2001) (describing regulatory model and distinguishing it from
the antidiscrimination model). See also Trujillo, Mission Possible at section II.b (comparing the
regulatory and the antidiscriminatory models of the WTO.
50 See Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, supra note 45, at 2577
(specifically discussing the casebook, COMPARATIVE CONSrTUTIONALisM, as applying a
neofunctionalist perspective to comparative constitutional law). The author goes on to state that
'the functionalist approach to the definitional query is to abstract constitutional problems from
their contexts. This approach does not pay adequate attention to the extent to which constitutional
problems are informed by politics and culture.' See ibid. at 2578.
5' See also Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 5, at 13 (citing Robert Ahdieh in
explaining that a dialogical relationship among domestic and international tribunals may help
'develop ajoint jurisprudence partly in tandem and partly in tension with each other.'.
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are different and yet are trading partners. A classroom consisting of U.S., Mexican and
Canadian students is a good forum for inculcating a sense that they are members of a
larger problem-solving capacity network, larger than the domestic or local one to
which they may be accustomed.
Though this paper focuses primarily on my own experience in developing a
transnational course, it also expresses some more general reflections regarding cross-
border legal education. In setting up the framework of a transnational NAFTA course,
I worked with my Mexican colleague, Professor Gabriel Cavazos from the ITESM who
was teaching a NAFrA course in the LL.M. Program in International Trade Law (el
Instituto Tecnol6gico de Monterrey, Maestria en Derecho Comercial Internacional)
in Monterrey, Mexico. First, we outlined the objectives of such a course. The objective
was to provide something that our students would not be able to get in a more
traditional NAFTA course. We identified a few key points:
1. Students should achieve a basic understanding of the basic principles of
international trade law more generally and of NAFTA more specifically and how these
principles pertained to and affected their own local parochial interests and the
interests of their future cients.52
2. Student should learn basic differences in the political structures and legal
systems of their counterparts. But they should also understand where commonalities
are, to the extent they exist, including historical, political and economic ones.
3. Finally, students should experience first hand 'an exchange' to help them see
for themselves where there are differences and where they may draw on their
commonalities. We chose a simulated arbitration as a joint exercise. We used Corn
Products because it allowed students to work together with an unresolved Chapter 11
NAFrA investor-state arbitration case that also contained issues being adjudicated
before a WTO panel. This allowed us to raise many issues pertaining to protectionism
more generally and jurisdictional overlaps between the NAFFA and the WTO dispute
resolution bodies and their regimes.
Some of the more practical questions we needed to address related to
methodology and collaboration more generally, the 'exchange' that should occur and
the role of technology. In teaching transnationally, collaboration first begins with the
willingness of the professors as well as that of their institutions. In our case, there had
already been some ongoing negotiations between our universities regarding the
possibilities for establishing joint programs and faculty exchanges for collaborative
research. At the very minimum, the backdrop for such a course should be one
characterized by what John Sexton calls a 'minimalist model' in which the faculty
5 Interestingly, in my experience with this course, students have been primarily from Michigan,
Ontario and Nuevo Leon-all regions deeply affected by the implementation of NAFrA. Many of
the students had experienced first hand these affects.
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members and the institutions themselves act independently, while collaborating under
'an umbrella entity' which facilitates the exchange.3
Second, we had to consider what exactly we were exchanging through this
course.54 To the extent that a transnational course is based on an exchange of legal
skills and cultural perspectives to resolve common problems, we also needed to find
ways of drawing on our commonalities in order to achieve a cohesive educational
experience for our students.ss This began with the professors sharing outlines and
syllabi of the course as if each were to teach it independently of the other. We
integrated these into one course syllabus that we then adapted for our own class.
Naturally, one of the most obvious obstacles to overcome in such an exchange is the
language barrier. In our case, this was a moot point since we had the good fortune that
the Mexican LL.M. students as well as Professor Cavazos were fluent in English.s6
However, the students manifested their linguistic differences in other ways-through
syntax and interpretation of legal issues and even in differing analytical approaches to
the relevant international law.
Differences in methodological teaching approaches also had to be
considered. Whereas U.S. legal education focuses primarily on interactive learning
such as the Socratic method or problem-solving approach, Mexican law schools tend to
show a preference for lectures rather than cooperative learning (though in some
schools like ITESM, other methods are being used as well).57 Professor Cavazos and I
decided that each professor should teach in his or her preferred way the basic
principles of NAFrA, but we coordinated the scheduling of the topics being taught, the
book being used and outside reading materials. We invited a guest lecturer from the
department of economics and business administration from ITESM for the first
videoconference session who lectured on the effects of NAFTA on Mexico. This allowed
the UDM students to understand more clearly the impact of NAFTA on our Mexican
counterparts.s
53 See Sexton, The Academic Calling: To Global Common Enterprise, supra note i, at 405.
54 See generally Margaret Y.K. Woo, Reflections on International Legal Education and Exchanges,
51 J. Legal Educ. 449 (2001) (discussing the essence of international legal education and
exchange).
55 See ibid. at 451 (stating that 'exchanges' in the context of international education consists not
only of exchanges within substantive law areas, but also an exchange of skills, values and the
cultures within the differing legal systems).
56 Although the author is also fluent in Spanish and some of the American students spoke Spanish
as well, the joint portions of the course were conducted in English. Also, the ITESM students were
graduates students studying in the LLM. program for International Trade ITESM.
57 See Woo, supra note 54, at 453 (discussing different teaching methodologies, some based on a
passive approach and others on active learning). See also Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas,
supra note 3, at 1o79-1o99 (comparing the education systems of Canada, the US and Mexico).
Several professors at the ITESM were also educated in the U.S. and that influence can be felt in a
gradual shift in the traditional Mexican teaching methods.
58 We did not have a Canadian or U.S. lecturer, but such participation would be useful in the
future.
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Third, we had to consider the role of technology in bridging not only
geographical distances, but also language barriers. By characterizing our course as a
web-based course, we could facilitate the exchange among the students at both schools
and use it as a supplement to learning in the classroom. It was also a means for
teaching foreign students while teaching our own.s9 We used the web to communicate
with students as if they were all in one classroom. Through video-conferencing,
students from both schools presented mock oral arguments on the Corn Products
investor-state case to a simulated tribunal, consisting of students from both schools. In
this way, all participants could appreciate the different styles of advocacy presented by
lawyers from the continental and common law traditions.6- For example, the Mexican
students had a more formalist reading of the NAFrA and WTO treaties as normative
instruments. In contrast, the tendency of the U.S students was to attempt to look at
precedent, despite the lack of formal stare decisis in this area.
In using a simulated arbitration, comparative inquiries can be useful not only
for understanding the similarities and differences among legal systems, but also as a
backdrop for deciding which aspects of different legal traditions to adopt in resolving
the many different problems arising under international trade law. An exercise in the
arbitration process offers an opportunity to engage in a dialogical approach to WTO
and NAFrA jurisprudence rather than a functionalist one.61 Ruti Teitel describes the
functionalist approach in the constitutional law context as presuming a "normative
constitutional vision across societies" 62 whereas a dialogical discourse allows for a
dynamic interpretative that focuses on the judicial processes and interpretation and
may draw from various sources of law.63
In a similar way, adjudicatory practices of the WTO panels and NAFrA
Chapter 11, 19 and 20 tribunals, for example, can be viewed as dynamic and evolving,
finding their authority both in normative standards of international trade law, to the
extent they exist, and in a more fluid multilateral system that amasses several legal
traditions and political cultures.64
IV. Lessons Regarding Educational Exchanges and Parochialism
In conclusion, several lessons emerged from this legal educational exchange. First, it
appears that whether the NAFrA arbitration fosters a functionalist approach or a
59 See Ruth Buchanan and Sundhya Pahuja, Using the Web to Facilitate Active Learning: A
Trans-Pacific Seminar on Globalization and the Law, 53 J.LEGAL EDUC. 578 (2003) (discussing
the different ways that the Internet may be used to facilitate teaching).
60 See Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas, supra note 3, at 1062-1072 (describing differences in
the civil law approaches and the common law approaches in all three countries).
61 Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, supra note 45, at 2584-2586.
62 Ibid. at 2576.
63 Ibid. at 2584-2586. Professor Teitel states that the dialogical perspective "theoriz[es]
comparative constitutionalism as a dynamic interpretive and discursive practice." Ibid at 2584-
2585.
64 Ibid. at 2585. See also supra section Ilb.
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dialogical one to resolving international trade issues depends, at some level, on the
legal tradition of the interpreter. That is, a civil lawyer may tend to deal with a legal
problem from a different perspective than that of a common law attorney. During our
simulated arbitration, it was notable that the Mexican students tackled the alleged
violations first by using literal treaty interpretations of the NAFTA treaty itself as well
as the WTO agreements rather than prior disputes. They focused on the 'correct'
understanding of the relevant provisions governing the alleged violations. On the other
hand, the U.S. students would begin with the facts themselves, using the rule of law as
the guide to better understand relevant facts as they pertained to the relevant
provisions.65 The UDM students looked to prior NAFTA Chapter 11 cases and even
WTO decisions in trying to find the best interpretation of the NAFTA provisions,
despite being aware that there are no formal stare decisis in this context. This
illustrates one of the big differences between the two legal systems - the role of the
judiciary. In Mexico, the primary sources of law do not include case law and the
legislatures and national agencies have a more authoritative role in creating new law
than the courts do. By contrast, the role of the U.S. judiciary is much more
pronounced; courts can set precedent and create new law. 66 Interestingly, as the
discussions among the students from both schools developed over time, the Mexican
students also began to look to precedent. The UDM students, on the other hand, began
trying to understand the 'plain meaning' of the relevant provisions of NAFTA and were
concerned about the arbitrators creating expansive interpretations that were beyond
their scope.
Second, despite the occasional comment regarding general disillusionment
with compliance in international agreements, the students treated each other with
respect. Their willingness to learn from one another was evident. This willingness and
interest to learn from their foreign counterparts ultimately created a forum for healthy
discourse. No one side dominated the discussion and no one legal tradition supplanted
the other. The students even recognized moments of differences in legal approaches
and adapted their own way of thinking to better understand their counterparts. In this
way, the simulated arbitration was dynamic and pluralist in nature, leaving room for
multiple interpretations.
Finally, there were lessons about the effect of parochial attitudes on
international adjudicatory processes. We saw that it is important for us as
international lawyers and educators to recognize not only that parochialism exists, but
also that it serves a perceived purpose for those benefiting from being a member of a
problem-solving capacity network In Mexico-Tax Measures, for example, the
Mexican government argued before the WTO panel and Appellate Body that Mexico
6
5 See Drumbl, Amalgam in the Americas, supra note 3, at 1o66-1o69 (explaining differences in
approaches to legal problems between a common law attorney and a civil law attorney). Generally
speaking, civilian lawyers will as an initial matter focus on the "plain meaning" of the text and
interpretation of code provisions are taken out of their historical context and applied according to
"the current sense of justice and ...to its purpose." See ibid. at 1o67.
66 Ibid. at lo66; 1o7o . Professor Drurnbl emphasizes that the important role of the 'common law
judge creates a need for some consistency in how judges exercise their power.' See ibid. at 1070.
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had a special interest in protecting its sugar industry, especially in the context of a
larger sugar dispute between the United States and Mexico. Whether placing a tax on
soda bottlers using high fructose corn syrup is the most efficient means of aiding the
Mexican sugar industry is arguable and best left to the economists. 67 However, at a
more individual level, NAFTA students studying this case, though from different
countries, did in fact sympathize with Mexico and the challenges of adapting a
traditionally protected sugar industry, deeply drenched in local politics, to free market
principles. They understood first hand the difficulties of transitioning regulated
markets and adapting them for free trade as well as the challenges for foreign investors
in those markets. Students were able to set aside their own parochial attitudes and
perceptions of their counterparts and debate common issues arising out of a shared
sphere of regionalism.
Such an exercise presents an opportunity for creating a shift in parochialism
paradigms, one from domestic parochialism to one that incorporates several regional
exchange networks and may help to generate a new common tradition.68 This new
common tradition may be one that invokes cultural, political and economic ties,
leading to hybridization. In doing this, domestic parochialism will be only one part of a
quilt consisting of a patchwork of parochial interests. Such regional parochialism
should not be the basis for diverging from the multilateral regime, but rather, should
67 See e.g. Alan Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 UNIV.
CHI. L. REV. i (1999). See generally, Anne 0. Kreuger, EcONOMIC POLICIES AT CROSS PURPOSES: THE
UNITED STATES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 251.
68See also Steve Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems, supra note
3, at 401 (explaining that NAFrA creates not only economic ties but also 'brings three disparate
societies into closer contact' through 'formal and informal transactions between citizens of the
NAFrA countries' in a phenomenon he describes as the 'NAFrA exercise.').
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ground itself within the multilateral framework. Strengthening and defining this
framework is also necessary. However, at a more individual level, students of NAFrA
participating in a joint course, though from different countries, can in fact set aside
their own parochial attitudes and participate in shared hybrid regional space. In doing
so, legal education can play an important role in helping to engender a new common
tradition for all parties involved.
